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InTroDucTIon
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court vacated por-tions of a preliminary injunction limiting the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar in training 
exercises.1 Environmental organizations argued that MFA sonar 
would cause injury to marine mammals.2 Ultimately, the Court 
held that the Navy’s interest in adequately training its sailors 
outweighed the alleged irreparable injury.3 
legal backgrounD anD argumenTs
This case involves Navy MFA sonar training exercises 
performed in the waters off the coast of southern California 
(“SOCAL”).4 The Navy’s fleet faces a threat from diesel-elec-
tric submarines because they operate “almost silently” and are 
“extremely difficult to detect and track.”5 To track these sub-
marines, the Navy uses MFA sonar, “which involves emitting 
pulses of sound underwater. . . .”6 To ensure that sonar operators 
are “thoroughly skilled” in its use, the Navy conducts regular 
training exercises under “realistic conditions.”7
At least thirty-seven species of marine mammals can be 
found in the SOCAL operating area.8 The plaintiffs assert that 
“MFA sonar can cause much more serious injuries to marine 
mammals than the Navy acknowledges, including permanent 
hearing loss, decompression sickness, and major behavioral 
disruptions.”9 Furthermore, the plaintiffs allege that MFA sonar 
has been linked to “several mass strandings of marine mam-
mals” in the area. 10
Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.11 The environmental groups asserted that the training 
exercises violated several federal laws, including the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).12 Under NEPA, 
an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) must be prepared 
for any “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment.”13 However, no EIS is required if, 
based on a shorter environmental assessment (“EA”), a federal 
agency determines that “the proposed action will not have a sig-
nificant impact on the environment.”14
In February 2007, the Navy prepared an EA that concluded 
that the SOCAL training exercise scheduled through January 
2009 “would not have a significant impact on the environment” 
and, because of this finding, did not prepare a full EIS.15 The 
Navy insisted that MFA sonar could only cause “temporary 
injury or disruption of behavioral patterns such as migration, 
feeding, surfacing and breeding.”16 
Based on the plaintiffs’ demonstration of a “possibility of 
success” on their claims under NEPA and another federal law, 
the District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the Navy from using MFA sonar during its training exercises.17 
The District Court further determined that there was “a ‘near 
certainty’ of irreparable injury to the environment, and that this 
injury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy.”18
The Navy appealed. The Court of Appeals held that this 
“blanket injunction” was “overbroad” and remanded to the Dis-
trict Court.19 The District Court then entered a revised prelimi-
nary injunction, imposing six restrictions on the Navy’s use of 
MFA sonar training exercises.20 
However, in a simultaneous development, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) allowed the Navy to adopt 
“alternative arrangements” because the injunction created a 
“significant and unreasonable risk” that Navy sailors would 
“not be able to train and be certified as fully mission capable.”21 
Therefore, the CEQ authorized the Navy to continue its training 
exercises under previously adopted mitigation measures.22
Subsequently, the Navy moved to vacate the District Court’s 
preliminary injunction with respect to two of the imposed con-
ditions.23 The District Court rejected the Navy’s motion.24 The 
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the preliminary injunc-
tion was appropriate because “the balance of hardships and 
a consideration of the public interest weighed in favor of the 
plaintiffs.”25 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.26 
holDIngs
The Supreme Court vacated the portions of the  preliminary 
injunction challenged by the Navy.27 The Court concluded that 
the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility” of irreparable harm  standard 
was too lenient to warrant a preliminary injunction, stating 
that their “frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs 
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seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is 
likely.  .  .  .”28 Furthermore, “even if plaintiffs have shown 
 ir rep arable injury .  .  . any such injury is outweighed by the  public 
interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training. . . 
.”29 The Court further concluded that the “most serious possible 
injury” to plaintiffs would be “harm to an unknown number of 
the marine mammals that they study and observe.”30
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conclusIon
The Navy’s arguments challenged the government’s obli-
gation to adhere to environmental laws.31 Therefore, some 
environmental groups feared that an unfavorable ruling would 
essentially excuse the government from performing studies 
of the effects of their actions on the environment.32 However, 
Chief Justice Roberts evaded such broad arguments, writing 
that the majority did not mean to say that military interests will 
always trump environmental concerns.33 In addition to the deci-
sion’s narrow language, some protections for marine mammals 
are still intact, as four of the originally imposed restrictions on 
MFA sonar use remain.34
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